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Abstract— Data collection, access and usage are essential for 
many forms of collaborative research. E-Health represents one 
area with much to gain by sharing of data across organisational 
boundaries. In such contexts, security and access control are 
essential to protect the often complex, privacy and information 
governance concerns of associated stakeholders. In this paper we 
argue that semantic technologies have unique benefits for 
specification and enforcement of security policies that cross 
organisation boundaries. We illustrate this through a case study 
based around the International Niemann-Pick Disease (NPD) 
Registry (www.inpdr.org) - which typifies many current e-Health 
security processes and policies. We show how approaches based 
upon ontology-based policy specification overcome many of the 
current security challenges facing the development of such 
systems and enhance access control by leveraging existing 
security information associated with clinical collaborators.   
Keywords— access control; trust management; Niemann-Pick 
Disease; ontology 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
With the demands for increased safety and effectiveness of 
medications, diagnostic products, and disease prevention, 
collaborative e-health projects have attracted considerable 
interest and importance over the last decade [1]. Many e-Health 
projects utilise electronic health record systems to support a 
range of research demands: public health, patient care through 
to biomedical/clinical research. To offer secure access to 
sensitive information, data protection mechanisms are essential 
[2]. In particular, before allowing (authorising) users to access 
data/services, trust relationships need to be established. For 
flexibility and scalability, ideally these trust relationships 
should be established between entities that were potentially 
unknown to each other before and leveraging a range of pre-
existing information to determine access control decisions. 
These entities might be users but more commonly they will be 
organisations that have agreed to trust one another – to a 
certain degree! The degree of trust can and indeed often will 
vary between organisations. The most elementary of trust 
relationships is that a given organisation accepts the 
authentication processes adopted and used by a collaborating 
organisation. Authentication is a typical starting point of 
security. This federated level of trust is now widely adopted in 
academia through utilisation of the Internet2 Shibboleth 
technologies (https://shibboleth.net/) to support decentralised 
authentication models. Authentication only provides basic trust 
and the clinical domain in particular requires much finer-
grained access control mechanisms – ideally to support policy-
based access control (authorisation) models. 
In this context, this paper utilises semantic web 
technologies to support such capabilities. We focus on 
improved reasoning and establishment of a trust management 
framework associated with the International Niemann-Pick 
Disease (NPD) Registry (INPDR - www.inpdr.org).  
Niemann-Pick diseases are rare genetic diseases with distinct 
clinical spectrum and extremely poor prognosis for patients. 
Currently there is no specific cure for NPD. The scarcity of 
patients and associated lack of neurological expertise has led 
to challenges in delayed diagnosis and difficulty in treating 
patients [5]. The rarity of the condition demands that 
centralisation (aggregation) of patient information occurs. The 
INPDR has been established to aggregate such information 
from patients originating from many centres and countries. 
The INPDR system has a simple yet powerful security model, 
however we believe that semantic technology combined with 
federated authentication could greatly improve the scalability, 
and ultimately the usability and flexibility of the platform. 
The INPDR system has adopted a role-based access control 
model (RBAC) to restrict access and use of the patient data in 
the registry. In order to access the registry, users are required to 
enroll and be assigned a “username/password” and given an 
associated role. The username is currently based on their 
existing email address. In this model, both authentication 
(username/password) and authorisation (the roles they are 
assigned) are based on a single, centralised model in which 
INPDR security administrators have to deal with individual 
requests. Each request requires consultation with existing 
INPDR collaborators to ratify that the requestor is known and 
should be given a particular access privilege. Once ratified, a 
list of pre-defined roles/attributes is used to assign privileges to 
the new user. This model works, however it has clear 
limitations when the system scales to deal with hundreds or 
thousands of clinicians/researchers where they may move from 
hospitals or be assigned new positions within their 
organisations. Ideally, compared to this centralised security 
model, a scalable registry should be able to work with several 
trusted “attribute authorities” using information (credentials) 
from distributed participant organisations. Based on this, the 
registry should be able to grant/deny requestors based on their 
associated “proofs” of authentication and authorisation 
(existing privileges they may possess that have been assigned 
by one or more trusted authorities). Several authors have 
explored the extension to the Internet2 Shibboleth technology 
for federated authorisation, however the standardisation of 
UIC-ATC-ScalCom-CBDCom-IoP 2015
978-1-4673-7211-4/15 $31.00 © 2015 IEEE
DOI 10.1109/UIC-ATC-ScalCom-CBDCom-IoP.2015.90
407
roles and privileges required for authorisation remains a 
challenge [6][7]. 
The semantic web aims at providing an environment in 
which trust relations can be established between discrete 
entities through reasoning about the relations between concepts, 
such as semantic equivalence and subsumption [8]. This is 
particular applicable to mapping different security vocabularies 
and in inferring (evaluating) security policies. In this area, 
ontologies play an essential role in sharing knowledge and 
specifying policies [9]. This paper proposes an ontology-based 
authorisation and trust establishment framework, through 
which agreement between trusted authorities can be achieved 
and semantic reasoning between different vocabularies 
undertaken to provide enhanced access control decisions. 
Underpinning this work is the notion of a degree of trust related 
to authentication. At present a common platform for federated 
access control (authentication) in the health domain (or in 
government or many other domains) does not exist. The 
technologies to deliver such federated authentication 
leveraging pre-agreed trust relationships are available however, 
e.g. Shibboleth and OAuth [10]. We thus propose a model of 
future e-Health collaborations and not one that is immediately 
supported and adopted by the clinical research community. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Security in distributed systems normally includes two steps: 
trust establishment and access control. To authenticate entities 
in a distributed system, public key infrastructures (PKI) are 
commonly used. Earlier PKIs were designed for authentication 
and bound a globally unique identity to each public key. In the 
case of X.509-based PKIs, X.509 public certificates include a 
public key binding with the distinguished name (DN) of the 
key holder, to prove the identity of the public key holder. These 
keys are assigned by a trusted authority (Certificate Authority) 
that takes steps and processes to ensure that the user (as given 
by the DN) is who they claim to be. This often builds on local 
identity establishment steps (through a Registration Authority). 
Other existing PKIs include privacy enhanced mail (PEM) [11], 
securing the internet e-mail system, and the Pretty Good 
Privacy (PGP) [12], providing cryptographic routines for email 
and file storage. However, trust establishment in the Web is 
significantly different from that in closed systems, which is 
mainly based on “identity-capability” mappings. With the 
expansion of the web and increased number of diverse, remote 
users and organisations, and associated sources of (more or 
less) trusted information, the PKI model is being challenged in 
its scalability and flexibility, or more precisely the PKI model 
does not tackle finer-grained security demands facing many 
domains (such as e-Health).  
As e-Health systems required data to be accessible/cross 
organisational boundaries, it is essential that fine-grained 
security be supported. Many works have been undertaken 
regarding security in e-Health. To make sure that 
heterogeneous data access can be given the right “security 
behaviour”, Rossilawati et al. established a security 
classification model, in which communications are regulated in 
different security process contexts [13]. Key to this was 
avoiding unnecessary authorisation on sensitive resource 
access. Based on the principle of “least privilege”, workflow 
based access control (WBAC) has been proposed to refine the 
resource instances and adapt access rights bound to the 
workflow duties [14]. Such policy-driven methods are based on 
the assumption that messages from service requestors and 
providers can be understood bilaterally. However, with cross-
platform collaborations emerging, the scale of e-Health 
systems has substantially expanded in the last decade. As such, 
solutions to this issue including bridging gaps among 
distributed sites through flexible and heterogeneous security 
frameworks are essential, i.e. a common security vocabulary 
cannot be expected to exist. It is also noted that heterogeneous 
data vocabularies also exist with a variety of coding systems in 
use across e-Health data providers. A cross-platform secure 
architecture with multiple national and regional security 
domains is required to solve such issues [15]. With the help of 
an “inter-domain zone”, common security and interoperability 
services such as policy translation, distributed authentication, 
authorisation as well as auditing services can be established. 
The platform can use PKIs for authentication, allowing 
external clinicians (i.e. external to the organisation making 
data/services available) to access the records shared with the 
collaborating parties. Bridging technologies can be used to 
support integration of PKIs between different security (trusted) 
domains – recognising that this incurs challenges associated 
with certification path validation [16]. In this paper, we focus 
on the challenges of re-use and repurposing of authorisation 
information that exists across collaborating e-Health sites.  
Access control requires policy-based authorisations, i.e. 
“what can be done by users on remote distributed resources”. 
According to the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria 
[17], there are two types of access control models: 
discretionary access control (DAC) [18] and mandatory access 
control (MAC) [19]. DAC provides a means of restricting 
access to objects/resources based on the identity of subjects, 
leaving the granting and revoking of privileges up to the 
resource providers. Typically it can be implemented as access 
control lists (ACLs) and associated Capabilities. MAC is a 
means of restricting access to objects based on the sensitivity 
of the information related to the objects and the authorisation 
of subjects required and enforced as a clearance. RBAC was 
proposed with the notion of “grouping” of privileges, where 
users are defined as being members of a group (specifically 
having a given role) and the privileges are subsequently 
mapped to it. Different variants of RBAC have been proposed 
and implemented including Temporal RBAC [20], Location 
and Time-based RBAC [21] and Spatial RBAC [22]. Although 
people are attaching richer and richer semantics on these 
models, they are fundamentally based upon trust and largely 
static assignment of privileges to individuals. The exact 
privileges (roles) are required to be used in security policies for 
local decisions. Security-policies based upon a static set of pre-
negotiated and assigned privileges have scalability issues [23].  
To illustrate these issues we consider the Internet2 
Shibboleth technologies and their support for single sign-on 
(SSO) across academia, e.g. the Australian Access Federation 
(AAF - www.aaf.edu.au). The AAF allows academics across 
Australia to authenticate to a range of distributed services. The 
model has an underlying PKI that supports trusted 
communications between sources of identity (Identity 
Providers) and the services themselves (Service Providers). 
This model is based upon a pre-negotiated set of eduPerson 
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attributes, which are assigned by organisations within the AAF, 
e.g. the University of Melbourne. However knowing that a 
researcher is an academic from the University of Melbourne is 
not enough to make a decision to allow access to a resource 
such as the INPDR. Whilst the authentication may be trusted, 
the finer-grained roles and privileges that are associated with 
INPDR are typically not known to the University of Melbourne 
IdP managers (or indeed to remote identity providers that may 
support authorisation information related to access and use of 
the INPDR). Whilst it is possible to embed these roles into the 
IdP, e.g. by populating attributes designed for this purpose 
(eduPersonEntitlement), the scale of projects occurring at the 
University of Melbourne would make this centralised source of 
attributes unworkable. Other more flexible solutions are 
therefore required.   
The application of semantic web technologies in access 
control and trust management has drawn considerable attention 
in recent years [25]. In terms of access control model 
specifications, ontologies can play the role of formalising 
concepts and their inter-relationships. By combining OWL 
ontologies and RBAC models, Finin et al. proposed the 
RBACOWL and showed how a “reasoner” could establish 
access control decisions. Furthermore, hierarchies existing in 
roles/attributes may lead to policy inheritance, which can 
facilitate security management [26]. Based on this, Javanmardi 
et al. presented a semantic-based access control model (SBAC) 
in which all concepts in the subject, object and action domains 
could be formally defined [27]. By reasoning about 
subsumption in these domains, potential authorisations could 
be achieved by policy propagation. Since ontologies are a well-
structured tool for knowledge construction, they can be used to 
share knowledge and avoid ambiguity. Leithead et al. exploited 
ontologies in credentials modelling [28]. By sharing such 
credentials between independent entities, they showed how 
problems such as information leakage and unnecessary 
disclosure in trust negotiation could be resolved effectively. In 
this paper, we apply ontologies to access control systems not 
only when there is a well-formed knowledge, but by reasoning 
and querying to achieve further potential authorisations based 
upon derived (reasoned) knowledge. 
III. AUTHORISATION AND TRUST MANAGEMENT IN THE 
INPDR 
Through the INPDR, clinicians from around the world that 
deal with patients with Niemann-Pick Diseases must request to 
be enrolled to access and use the registry. Once ratified, they 
are assigned a username/password and a set of given privileges. 
Having enrolled, these clinicians are able (subject to privilege) 
to input a fixed set of pre-agreed patient data through targeted 
forms, which is subsequently used (again subject to access 
control privileges) for searching and analysing these data sets. 
Centres from around the world currently delegate the 
responsibility for assignment and management of privileges 
and their subsequent enforcement to the centralised INPDR 
provider. However even with this delegation, it is the case that 
all sites can be autonomous to varying degrees and define their 
own degrees of data sharing policies. Current data sharing 
levels include the “Centre”, i.e. only researchers/clinicians 
from that Centre can access this data; the “Country”, i.e. only 
researchers/clinicians from that Country can access this data, 
and “ALL” where anyone who can authenticate to the INPDR 
registry is allowed to access this data. With this centralised 
model of delegation to the registry, explicit centralised trust on 
the assignment and enforcement of all aspects of security is 
adopted.   
A. Role Definitions 
Within the INPDR several pre-agreed roles have been 
identified as the basis for making access control decisions 
within the registry: “Clinician”, “Local Collaborator”, “Local 
Researcher” as well as “Other Researcher. It should be noted 
that these roles were primarily identified through experiences 
in supporting a range of other similar registries and not through 
explicit requirements and needs that were identified by the 
INPDR research community. Based on the assignment and 
possession of these roles, people with different roles are 
subsequently able to perform different sets of actions on 
specific datasets. Specifically the roles and the allowed actions 
are shown in TABLE I. 
TABLE I ROLE MEANING OF THE REGISTRY 
Role Names Local/Remote Meaning 
Clinician Local 
can create/edit/delete data for his/her Centre; 
can read all data tagged as his/her Centre; 
can read all data tagged as his/her Country; 
can read all data tagged as ALL; 
Local 
Collaborator Local 
can create/edit data for his/her Centre; 
can read all data tagged as his/her Centre; 
can read all data tagged as his/her Country; 
can read all data tagged as ALL; 
Local 
Researcher Local 
can read all data for his/her Centre; 
can read all data tagged as his/her Country; 
can read all data tagged as ALL; 
Other 
Researcher Remote can read all data tagged as ALL; 
  
 It should be noted that all patients are associated with a 
specific Clinician whose email address is given (and the only 
truly identifying data in the registry). As well as being the only 
person where further information on the patient can be 
obtained or access to bio-specimens from the patient, the 
person with the Clinician role is responsible for ensuring that 
patient consent is obtained and ethics approval for entering data 
into the registry. 
B. Access Levels of Patient Data 
 Once a patient record is created, a unique patient identifier 
is automatically generated by the registry, which consists of the 
NPD type, the standardised abbreviated country-code, the 
abbreviated clinic identity and an integer that is associated with 
that individual, e.g. “NPAB-AUME1-2 indicates the 2nd 
Niemann-Pick patient (with NPD type A/B) from Australia, 
Melbourne centre 1. Figure 1 shows a subset of patient listing 
in the INPDR.  
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Figure 1 Summary of NPD Type A/B Patient RECORDS 
 The INPDR is a completely centralised solution. It is 
currently used by clinicians/researchers from across the world 
including contributors from Australia, USA and across Europe. 
All sites need to be registered beforehand. The Clinicians need 
to be associated with those sites. The enrolment processes is 
based upon review of each individual case for access/enrolment.  
This has obvious scalability issues. When a clinician or 
researcher logs into the system, the security policy 
automatically restricts/enforces their abilities in the registry. 
Thus for example, creating a patient record in the system will 
have a patient record that is automatically populated with the 
Clinician and Centre related information based on the assigned 
privileges. 
 At present the system works relatively well given the 
number of collaborators and sites. However it will face 
scalability and other non-technical issues moving forward. 
Having a single source of authentication and authorisation 
information will be challenged where there are hundreds of 
sites and thousands of researchers involved. Furthermore, this 
centralised model cannot handle the decentralised evolution of 
organisations and people. Thus if a clinician moves hospitals or 
has a different role within the hospital then there is no way to 
identify this. An improved model would be to support 
decentralised security authentication and utilisation of 
existing/distributed authorisation credentials. 
 Thus instead of setting one central registry used to 
authenticate all users and define and assign roles/attributes for 
each user, we assume a decentralised model whereby 
authentication is made by remote sites, and authorisation 
information (credentials) are asserted by one or more remote 
sites and used (reasoned about) to make local enriched access 
control decisions. However this raises a range of challenges. 
Federated authentication is dependent upon standardisation and 
agreement of a range of pre-specified/agree core attributes and 
degrees of trust. Within the AAF this is based upon the 
SAML2 protocol [29] and exchange of eduPerson attributes 
with an underpinning PKI to ensure secure communications 
between the IdPs and SPs in the federation. Such federated 
access control does not exist across hospitals and certainly not 
(yet!) in an international setting.  
 A second challenge is in the attributes used for finer-
grained access control decisions and their lack of 
standardisation. In an international setting, language-specific 
roles will be commonplace and will not work with existing 
security systems expecting the roles of “clinician” etc. A 
multitude of sources of authority will exist with keys and 
processes that they use for assignment of keys that are used for 
signing trusted attributes. Semantic reasoning has the ability to 
overcome many of these issues. The Shibboleth-based 
architecture that we have adopted to illustrate the utilisation of 
semantic web technologies in this context is shown in Figure 2. 
Compared with the INPDR’s built-in centralised system taking 
the responsibilities of authentication and authorisation, this 
decentralised model leverages several trusted sites through 
delegating a set of pre-agreed roles, attributes and privileges.  
Figure 2  Underpinning decentralised access control model 
 For example, Dr. Bruno Bembi working for the “ITUD2” 
(Hospital-2 from Udine, Italy) may send a request to the 
INPDR for records of patients with NPD.  With decentralised 
authentication, he will be redirected back to his home site for 
identity authentication. The Where-Are-You-From (WAYF) 
service is a core component in Shibboleth systems used for 
selection of IdPs. In this scenario, Dr. Bembi selects ITUD2 
and confirms his identity. At this point several possibilities 
exist. The ITUD2 IdP may choose to send the authentication 
information and roles (attributes) that they are willing to 
release to the INPDR. More complex negotiations are also 
possible at this point depending on the level of trust. We 
assume here that his role as a doctor (Medico) is released as a 
digitally signed and trusted attribute certificate and that his 
identity is recognised by the INPDR as a trusted collaborator. 
We also assume that such international federations are possible 
and supported. In the existing INPDR system, such a 
vocabulary would not allow access. However semantic web 
provides far richer reasoning capabilities. 
IV. ONTOLOGY-BASED SECURITY FRAMEWORK 
 By leveraging federated authentication and re-use of 
existing privilege related information, it is no longer necessary 
for the registry to be solely responsible for pre-assignment of 
static sets of “identity-role/attribute” mappings. As such, 
problems about scalability can be resolved to some degree. 
Thus if a doctor leaves a given hospital they will no longer be 
able to authenticate at that hospital and hence federated access 
to the registry will not be possible. However, this model also 
raises other problems in terms of semantic understanding. In 
the healthcare context, it is often the case that attributes with 
identical names issued by different organisations may have 
different meanings, while conversely other attributes with the 
same semantic meaning may be assigned different literal names. 
For example, to obtain a “doctor” certificate in Canada it is 
necessary to pass the Medical Council of Canada Evaluating 
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<owl2xml:ClassAssertion>
   <owl2xml:Class owl2xml:URI="&OntologyCaseStudy;CanbeViewedbyBI03"/> 

    <owl2xml:ObjectIntersectionOf>
<owl2xml:Class owl2xml:URI="&OntologyCaseStudy;PatientData"/>
<owl2xml:ObjectSomeValuesFrom>               /*ObjectProperty*/
               <owl2xml:ObjectProperty owl2xml:URI="&OntologyCaseStudy;belongTo"/>
          <owl2xml:ObjectOneOf>
              <owl2xml:Individual owl2xml:URI="&OntologyCaseStudy;Birmingham03"/>
          </owl2xml:ObjectOneOf>
 </owl2xml:ObjectSomeValuesFrom>
 
  <owl2xml:DataHasValue>                          /*DataProperty*/
          <owl2xml:DataProperty owl2xml:URI="&OntologyCaseStudy;accessLevelIs"/>
               <owl2xml:Constant>Centre</owl2xml:Constant>





  <owl2xml:ObjectUnionOf> 
        <owl2xml:ObjectSomeValuesFrom>                   /*ObjectProperty*/ 
         <owl2xml:ObjectProperty owl2xml:URI="&OntologyCaseStudy;hasRoleIs"/> 
<owl2xml:ObjectOneOf> 
     <owl2xml:Individual owl2xml:URI="&OntologyCaseStudy;Clinician"/> 
     <owl2xml:Individual owl2xml:URI="&OntologyCaseStudy;LocalCollaborator"/> 
     <owl2xml:Individual owl2xml:URI="&OntologyCaseStudy;LocalResearcher"/> 
 </owl2xml:ObjectOneOf> 
          </owl2xml:ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
        </owl2xml:ObjectUnionOf> 
 
        <owl2xml:ObjectSomeValuesFrom>                       /*ObjectProperty*/ 
          <owl2xml:ObjectProperty owl2xml:URI="&OntologyCaseStudy;belongTo"/> 
    <owl2xml:ObjectOneOf> 
         <owl2xml:Individual owl2xml:URI="&OntologyCaseStudy;Birmingham03"/> 
     </owl2xml:ObjectOneOf> 
         </owl2xml:ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
Examination (MCCEE. http://www.mcc.ca/en/exams/). This 
examination contains completely different programs compared 
with the Australian Medical Council examination (AMC. 
http://www.amc.org.au/). This means in some cases, “Doctor” 
credentials issued by different sites should be granted with 
different privileges to certain datasets. Furthermore language 
issues also arise, e.g. in the UK/US/Australian terms such as 
doctor, have international counterparts such as French 
(docteur), German (arzt) and Italian (medico). These 
relationships cannot be matched by standard security 
approaches. The same issues apply to nurses, French 
(infirmier), German (krankenschwester), and Italian 
(infermiera), as well as for other more specialised roles, e.g. 
paediatric endocrinologist.  For these issues, semantic-based 
approaches such as ontology engineering can play the role of a 
“bridge” between vocabularies, which may be “different” 
literally and/or semantically. 
A. Formalising the Access Control Model 
 To illustrate the potential of semantic web technologies in 
the e-Health security domain we explored a range of case 
studies around key challenges associated with the INPDR. We 
illustrate the realisation of these challenges using the ontology 
editor, protégé 4.0 (http://protege.stanford.edu/) to represent 
common elements by “class” (e.g. roles, subjects, countries, 
etc.) and specific instances by “individual”, e.g. “Clinician” 
under the class of Role and “Udine02” under the class of Italy. 
Such concepts can be further related by different properties 
such as “belongTo”, “hasRoleIs” and “accessLevelIs” etc. For 
example in Figure 3, as one instance of class “PatientData”, the 
record of “NPAB-UKBI3-1” is set with three properties: 
“belongTo” the centre Birminham03, the “accessLevel” as 
Centre and the “typeIs” NPAB (one form of Niemann-Pick 
disease).  
Figure 3 Specification of patient “NPAB-UKBI3-1” 
 With these basic concepts and relations, different enhanced 
types of authorisation can be described and enforced as a 
“restricted class”. Authorisation at different levels can be 
realised by “linking” the restricted subject and object in pairs. 
For example, the authorisation of viewing data for the 
Birmingham03 can be divided into two parts: retrieving the 
target data and filtering the qualified users as shown in Figure 4 
and Figure 5. In this way, improved reusability of the discrete 
classes can be achieved. Rather than explicitly code the 
security policy, flexible reasoning about the policy using pre-
existing data is possible. In this model, access to read data 
requires both a translation of the credentials that the user may 
have and the potential data sets that may exist that can be 
satisfied by presentation of these credentials.  
Figure 4  The data can only be viewed for Birmingham03 (centre only) 
Figure 5 Subjects can view the data only for centre “Birmingham03” 
 To further represent the enhanced function offered by 
semantic web for reasoning and querying, consider users (X, Y 
and Z) with associated information as shown in TABLE II. We 
consider a scenario where user X has interest in the information 
related to patient “NPABUKBI3-01”. To determine if he/she 
has the right to view the patient data, the relevant policy rules 
must be evaluated. Firstly, by querying with the patient ID, 
only one rule can be filtered out, since the patient from 
“Birmingham” has the access level set as “Centre”.  At this 
stage, the corresponding querying of the “link” relation is 
checked to establish all qualified subjects. If the current 
requestor is included, then the privilege will be granted. As 
shown in Figure 6, since the result is matched, user X will be 
granted access to view the record. 
TABLE II EXAMPLES OF REQUESTORS 
 Country Centre Role 
X UK Birmingham Clinician 
Y Australia Sydney Other Researcher 




  <owl2xml:Individual owl2xml:URI="&OntologyCaseStudy;Clinician"/>
  <owl2xml:Individual owl2xml:URI="&OntologyCaseStudy;Arzt"/>
</owl2xml:SameIndividuals>
Figure 6 Checking the qualified requestors 
B. Discussion 
1) Enhanced Access Control through Federation 
 Normally a federation consists of a group of organisations 
that are willing to share data and services (and hence trust one 
another). Through authenticating at their home sites, pre-agreed 
roles/attributes can be assigned to users for further role 
matching. A key challenge is the trust to initially enter the 
federation. Most identity federations are based upon 
established levels of trust, e.g. trust all universities on their 
processes for local identity management. In the e-Health 
domain, further fine-grained checks on the trust of an 
organisation will be needed. For example the reputation of the 
organisation and a much more rigorous check on the identity 
management procedures, e.g. do they have strong password 
protection policies and are users expected to change the 
passwords regularly. Assuming these checks are passed, the 
federation may send an invitation to the organisation for it to be 
a federated member [33]. Joining the federation provides a 
minimum of trust since it provides trusted authentication and 
does not yet include the necessary privileges to access sensitive 
resources such as the INPDR. Nevertheless, this model of 
federated authentication is essential to support flexible and 
scalable solutions based around systems such as INPDR since 
the centralised registry is completely ignorant of the local 
authentication systems and user management practices, and 
indeed whether the user is still a member of the given 
organisation.  
2) Enhanced Role Interpretation 
 As mentioned, access to and use of INPDR requires deeper 
levels of trust. Newly added centres require further negotiations 
in order to gain deeper trust. In any given federation, there 
should be a pre-agreed set of attributes and relations that exist. 
These should be used as the basis for any negotiation with 
regard to deeper trust. Consider a scenario where a German 
Medical Certification Department can issue credentials to 
German clinicians (in German “Arzt”). Without any annotation, 
the INPDR cannot recognise the information because it is in a 
different literal form “Clinician”. However, through accepting 
the practices used for its certification program, stakeholders of 
the INPDR may accept this role as a Clinician when dealing 
with the requests. Therefore, they agree to the mapping 
between “Arzt” and “Clinician” (see the mapping description in 
Figure 7). As shown in Figure 8, by releasing the role of Arzt 
from local organisation, user K can request to view the record 
of patient “NPAB-GEBE01-7” (See attributes “Country: 
Germany”, “Centre: Berlin01” and “Access Level: Centre”) of 
Figure 9. 
Figure 7 Setting the role mappings 
Figure 8 Assertion of attributes of requestor K 
 Since it can be reasoned that the user is a Clinician from 
Germany, the authorisation result shows user K can view the 
record in that centre (authorisation of viewing 
“NPABGEBE01-7” is evaluated by “CanViewBE01”). 
Figure 9 Checking the qualification of user K 
 To show the function of improved semantic understanding, 
equivalent mapping between terms can be undertaken.  As the 
ontology supports inference, such relations can be established 
based on richer analysis about the concepts themselves. 
Through making use of existing attributes, semantic models 
can infer other properties of policies. For example, some 
hospitals may not have the “Centre” attribute given explicitly 
in the user’s personal description; however such information 
can be ascertained from the email address.  
3) Enhanced “Country” and “Centre” Reasoning 
 Semantic web allows expressing basic concepts and 
relationships to make authorisation decisions with incomplete 
information. For example, consider patient “NPAB-UKBI03-
4” restricted for users with the access level of “Country”. Any 
user from a centre in the UK (Birmingham, London ...) can 
access this patient detail even without explicitly providing their 






        <owl2xml:Individual owl2xml:URI="&OntologyCaseStudy;X1"/>
        <owl2xml:Individual owl2xml:URI="&OntologyCaseStudy;London01"/>




        <owl2xml:Individual owl2xml:URI="&OntologyCaseStudy;X1"/>
        <owl2xml:Individual owl2xml:URI="&OntologyCaseStudy;Clinician"/>
    </owl2xml:ObjectPropertyAssertion>
specification of nationalities, it is possible to infer that a user 
from centre London01 can see “NPAB-UKBI03-4” as London 
is part of the UK. 
Figure 10 Federation structure of UK Organisation 
Figure 11 Attribute assertions for requestor X1 
Figure 12 Enhanced reasoning between centres and countries (Attributes) 
4) Enhanced Role Hierarchy Scalability 
 Since the credential “Arzt” can be mapped to “Clinician” it 
should also relate to the role hierarchy of a Clinician.  This can 
help in role hierarchy scalability. In this scenario, “Clinician” 
can perform all actions (delete/create/edit/read) on the specific 
data, while the “Local researcher” can only read these data 
resources. Someone with the German role of “Arzt” delegated 
as “Clinician” implies that he/she will be able to enjoy the 
privileges as given in that hierarchy. Without creating new 
contents in the original structure, it is possible to extend this by 
semantic bridges.  
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 Previous work on tackling authorisation and trust 
management in distributed systems has shown the limitations 
in terms of system scalability and autonomy. Inspired by the 
opportunities offered by federated authentication, we propose a 
decentralised access control model with distributed agents 
helping in authenticating and issuing credentials. In this context, 
semantic web technologies can facilitate the policy 
specification and evaluation. We have formalised an ontology-
based access control framework and explored its utility in the 
context of an international disease registry (INPDR). Based on 
a range of scenarios, we have shown how enhanced reasoning 
and querying can be achieved utilising semantic technologies. 
This work is based on the premise of a degree of trust 
underpinning the federated interactions, e.g. a PKI exists that is 
used for signing and hence trusting the security assertions. 
Such trust and hence federation does not yet exist however the 
technologies for federated authentication are now well 
established. Establishment of international trust federations is 
currently an active topic with work on integrating a range of 
national/international federated authentication systems. 
 The next phase of this work is to further explore strategies 
for negotiating trust and when to exchange sensitive 
information and with whom. More explicit models of roles and 
a suitable ontology applicable to e-Health environments will 
also be undertaken. The notion of reputation will be explored 
as a model for an on-going extension and refinement of 
existing trust mechanisms.  
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